International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?

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Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations’ effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.

KEYWORDS

Between April 2007 and March 2008, Amnesty International (AI) spent £33,595,000—about $53 million and 95% of all expended resources—on activities in furtherance of the group’s objectives (AI 2009:33). At the same

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time, Hafner-Burton (2008) found that AI’s efforts to name and shame states that use political terror have no pacific impact on that terror, and that states shamed by international actors may actually increase their use of terror after being targeted. And Franklin (2008) found that shaming by NGOs lessened repression in Latin American states with high foreign capital dependence. Academics and policymakers are similarly committed to improving human rights, yet those commitments manifest in different ways. This juxtaposition highlights a tension between those who act to limit human rights abuse and those who study that abuse: While the former continue to pour resources into publicizing political terror, the latter debate the efficacy of the policy. The scholarly literature on international organizations and human rights is thus at a critical juncture. Will this be an area where scholarly and policymaking discourses divide? Or will it be an area where academics engage questions with real policy-relevance? I argue that, given our mutual interest in protecting the innocent, human rights scholars should strive to inform policymakers.

Our limited ability to inform policy and the mixed nature of empirical results may stem from a single source: conceptual over-aggregation. Existing studies tend to aggregate international actors with similar policies into a single global unit. Thus naming and shaming by international NGOs, the news media, and the United Nations have been combined into a single index (for example, Hafner-Burton 2008). This approach precludes the possibilities that different actors, and different methods of publicizing atrocities, have different impacts on subsequent abuse. At the same time, existing work has tended to aggregate types of physical integrity abuse into a single scale. Thus unlawful imprisonment, torture, disappearance, and killing have been treated as a single physical integrity index (for example, Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012). This precludes the possibility that different types of abuse respond differently to publicity. This work provides valuable insights into the effects of IOs on state terror, but cannot speak to the effects of specific policies by specific actors on specific acts of repression.

I investigate the effects of one international policy—naming and shaming—on one form of physical integrity abuse—government killing. As the label suggests, naming and shaming is a policy of punishment by publicity designed to inflict “reputational damage on moral grounds” (Kahn 2005:4). Theoretically, shaming has been cast as a powerful tool for protecting human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Yet empirically, its impacts remain unclear: some studies find that it reduces subsequent physical integrity abuse (Franklin 2008), others find that its impacts are conditional on other influences (Murdie and Davis 2012), and still others find that it has no impact on or actually increases subsequent abuse (Bob 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008; Kuperman 2001).

Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that naming and shaming improves government respect for political freedoms (freedoms of movement, speech, and religion as well as workers’ rights and political participation), but does not find similar impacts on physical integrity rights.
With respect to human rights, I focus on the execution of noncombatants by government forces. Below, I develop a theory of one-sided government killing and focus on opportunities for international organizations to limit or prevent this type of violence through naming and shaming. Then, I present a research design intended to test my hypotheses. The fourth section presents the results of my empirical tests, and I conclude by unpacking this study’s implications for policymakers and scholars.

PRINCIPALS, AGENTS, AND KILLING

I define government killing as the intentional, extralegal killing of one’s own civilians.\(^2\) To explain the process by which killing occurs, I draw on a logic of delegation that has informed studies of domestic policymaking, international organizational structure, and judicial politics (for example, Huber and Shipan 2002; Staton and Vanberg 2008). That literature focuses on principal-agent problems between governments that design policies and bureaucrats who implement them (for example, Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999b). The observation motivating this work is that “making policy involves more than decisions by elected legislators and the president” (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987:243). Instead, “public bureaucracies, staffed largely by permanent civil servants, are responsible for the vast majority of policy initiatives taken by governments” (Putnam 1975:87). In short, governments are administrative bodies. Governments and bureaucrats administer to their populations by making and implementing policies that structure everyday life (Marx 1957). Many of these policies have life-or-death consequences for citizens; one such policy is the decision to kill civilians.

The logic of killing maps readily onto the canonical principal-agent story: There is one principal, a government leader, and one agent, a set of (potential) perpetrators. The principal chooses a policy (that is, identifies the population s/he wishes to kill), and then transmits the information to the agent.\(^3\) The agent either obeys or ignores the order to kill. If the agent ignores, no civilians die. If the agent obeys, he begins killing and produces an observed civilian body count.\(^4\)

This interaction is comparable to the interaction modeled by Huber and Shipan (2002). Two key elements of their story are particularly relevant. First, there is a clear distinction between a policy (what is spelled out in legislation) and an outcome (what happens in the real world once a policy is implemented).

\(^2\)This definition is similar in most respects to the definition of “mass killing” proposed by Valentino (2004:10–12). Valentino’s definition, however, requires a minimum of 50,000 intentional deaths over no more than five years, and includes cases where actors from State A killed civilians from State B. It differs from most other definitions (for example, Harff 2003; Midlarsky 2005) because it does not specify the intention to destroy a particular ethnic, religious or political group, in whole or in part.

\(^3\)As is typical in the political economy literature on delegation, I assume at the outset that the agent is a unitary actor (for example, Epstein and O’Halloran 1999a; Huber and Shipan 2002).

\(^4\)For a formal exposition of the theory, see DeMeritt (2009).
is adopted and implemented). Here, the leader chooses a policy (the number of civilians to be killed) and passes it to the perpetrator. The perpetrator’s response leads to the observed outcome (the number of civilians that actually die). Both actors are motivated by outcomes (Huber and Shipan 2002:82). I also follow Huber and Shipan—and the PA literature more generally—by allowing actors’ preferences to diverge. During a civil war, for example, the leader may want a rebel group entirely wiped out, whereas the perpetrator may want to kill only enough group members to end the violence. In the face of divergent preferences, the best available solution for principals is to alter the agent’s incentives to obey. Typically, this involves some combination of monitoring of the agent and a system of rewards and punishments; these strategies provide positive incentives for the would-be perpetrators to obey the leader’s order to kill (for example, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).

The violent context adds an important twist to the typical principal-agent story. In the canonical tale, both actors are risk neutral. Here, I assume that leaders want to retain power. I also assume that both governments and perpetrators are concerned with protecting their own freedoms. Finally, I assume that humans (including both leaders and perpetrators) value their own lives above the lives of others. The key consequence of these assumptions is that, because the decision to kill is riskier than other policy decisions, actors are influenced by their desires to retain power and freedom as well as by the benefits of implementing their preferred policy.

OCCUPUNITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

To this point, scholars have assumed that killing is a decision governments make. It occurs when leaders decide it will help them achieve a desired goal (quelling dissent, victory over rebels, etc.). As a result of this work, we know something about the conditions and incentives that push leaders toward killing: Civil and international war, regime type, guerrilla tactics, and violent dissent each impact the likelihood that leaders want to kill (for example, Downes 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004).

Yet as argued above, policy outcomes are not simple government choices. To model the link between leaders’ desires and observable outcomes, I propose a dynamic interaction between governments and perpetrators. I assume that once a leader decides to kill civilians, he relies on a group of individuals (typically soldiers and/or police) to implement the order. Each individual chooses whether (and how many) to kill. Thus killing is a two-stage process: The leader develops a preference for killing (as modeled in existing work), and then interacts with would-be perpetrators to put preference into practice (as modeled herein).5

5This conceptualization of killing as a strategic process expands on a growing body of literature by Downes (2006, 2008), Kalyvas (1999, 2006), Krain (1997, 2000), Midlarsky (2005), and Valentino (2000,
Since policies and outcomes are distinct, the leader’s preference for killing does not lead inescapably to democide. Instead, it leads both leaders and perpetrators to consider the potential outcomes of implementing a murderous policy: the consequences of that killing for their own lives and liberties. This is an opportunity for the international community. Governments have positive incentives to kill, and perpetrators have positive incentives to obey leaders’ orders. One way to limit civilian death tolls, then, is to provide countervailing negative incentives for both.

How might such incentives operate? Assume that individuals—including leaders and perpetrators—have expectations about the possible consequences of their choices. Among these is an expectation of how likely each is to be punished by the international community for ordering killing (as a leader) or actually killing civilians (as a perpetrator). As their individual expectations of punishment for killing increase, leaders and perpetrators see killing as increasingly risky.

Leaders are also attuned to the likelihood that, should they order killing, perpetrators will disobey. This shirking is costly: Governments want to stay in power, and one crucial measure of control is a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Weber 1994). If a leader sends a killing order and it is subsequently ignored, the government will have lost its coercive monopoly. Thus leaders face costs not only if they order killing and are then punished, but also if they send the killing order and have it subsequently disobeyed. So governments must develop expectations not only about the likelihood of their own punishment for killing, but also about the likelihood that perpetrators will shirk if given the order to kill. Both beliefs affect the leader’s expectations about the risk of killing civilians.

Although we cannot observe these individual-level expectations of risk, we can understand how they develop. Assume that each actor develops expectations of riskiness by observing the behavior of international actors vis-à-vis their country. In each country, there exists an information environment available to all leaders and perpetrators. Actors make use of that public information environment to develop beliefs about the likely consequences of killing. Assume, too, that each individual has some threshold above which they believe killing is too risky, and thus above which they are unwilling to make or obey the decision to kill. As the public information environment reports that killing is increasingly risky, more and more actors surpass that threshold and choose not to order killing (for leaders) and/or not to kill civilians (for perpetrators). Aggregate killing declines as a result.

2004) arguing that killing is instrumental: Leaders decide to kill civilians when it helps them achieve desired political goals.

*It is also true that people have private information, but here I focus on the public information held in common. This is because I am interested in understanding government killing aggregated at the country level, and commonly available information will influence these aggregate outcomes.
If this is true, then the international community can constrain government killing by raising actors’ beliefs about the riskiness of such killing. Specifically, the threat of international punishment reduces killing both directly (as leaders believe it is risky to order killing and perpetrators believe it is risky to kill) and indirectly (as leaders believe that perpetrators will shirk, and this adds to their perception of risk). If naming and shaming is to play this role, it must add information to the public environment that raises individual’s beliefs about the riskiness of killing. Below, I argue that it does.

The Impact of International Naming and Shaming

Naming and shaming is designed to “shine a spotlight on bad behavior [in order to] help sway abusers to reform” (Hafner-Burton 2008:690). Much extant work expects the policy to reduce repression because shamed states seek to get out of the unfriendly spotlight (Hopgood 2006) or are persuaded to adopt new norms respecting human rights (Risse and Sikkink 1999). Differently, I argue that leaders need not feel shame or change fundamental beliefs of acceptability in order for shaming to constrain state killing. Instead, shaming may reduce violence by calling the attention of other international actors capable of inducing tangible costs. Both leaders and perpetrators are aware of this international attention and thus concerned with its potential costs.

One such cost is legal punishment for killing. Since the Geneva Convention explicitly forbids willful killing, the international community is well-equipped to prosecute murderous leaders and perpetrators. With respect to leaders, the community has proven willing and able to punish them for crimes against humanity (consider, for example, the Nuremberg Trials, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein). From Hermann Göring to Slobodan Milošević to Omar Al Bashir, leaders face international legal punishment for ordering civilians killed.

Legal punishment is also a threat to individual perpetrators on the ground. Historically, subordinate actors accused of atrocities have defended themselves on the grounds that they were following orders (see, for example, Goldensohn 2005). The international community has rejected this defense, taking steps to invoke personal responsibility regardless of subordinate status. In 1474, for example, Peter von Hagenbach was tried by an ad hoc tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire for atrocities he committed during the occupation of Breisach. His defense was that he was merely following orders from the Duke of Burgundy; it was rejected, and von Hagenbach was found guilty of war crimes and beheaded (Greppi 1999).

Allied leaders anticipated similar defenses during the International Military Tribunal (IMT) to try German war criminals after World War II. To head them off and ensure individual-level responsibility, they issued the
London Charter of the IMT. It states, in part, “the fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of responsibility under international law.” Both Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl attempted to use the “superior orders” defense during the IMT, and both attempts were unsuccessful (Moghalu 2006). More recent examples exist (under Article 33 of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, for example), but the point is that individual-level perpetrators become war criminals the moment they obey the order to kill. They can, have, and should expect to be legally punished as such.

Attention drawn by shaming may also have economic consequences for murderous leaders and perpetrators. Publicizing poor behavior casts states as pariahs in the international community, sending “a signal that it is politically acceptable . . . to cut aid to the targeted countries” (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2009:10; see also Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schneider 2000). Empirical research shows that this signal has real economic consequences: When the UNCHR issues resolutions, for example, multilateral donors (and particularly the World Bank) respond with reduced amounts of foreign aid (Lebovic and Voeten 2009). In some states, these resolutions also lead to decreased bilateral aid donations and to decreased trade flows (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2009). And, shaming by human rights INGOs reduces the amount of foreign direct investment received by developing states (Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2012). When states are shamed for abuse, trade partners and aid donors respond with sanctions. The abusive state suffers costs: lost aid donations, trade relationships, and FDI. International actors “can and do respond to naming and shaming by increasing real [economic] costs” (Krain 2012:3).

For leaders, these costs have undesired consequences. Reduced resources limit the leader’s ability to achieve desired policies. Economic costs also limit the leader’s ability to satisfy his citizenry and thereby retain his grasp on power. “Thus shaming campaigns strike at the very mechanism by which . . . leaders maintain loyalty” (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2009:6). Economic sanctions for killing may also be costly for individuals. Foreign aid provides individual-level benefits including reduced immediate poverty, increased income, improved quality of health and education services, etc. (for example, Riddell 2007; Sachs 2006). Interdependence improves personal economic circumstances through market access and price supports (Anderson and Reichert 1995). Thus economic sanctions have the ability to impose costs for individuals on the ground, including would-be perpetrators. These sanctions are a potential cost for both leaders and perpetrators engaged in one-sided government killing.

Naming and shaming spotlights abusive states. This raises global awareness of atrocities, increasing the probability of international legal and/or economic punishment. As shaming increases, then, each actor’s belief about the riskiness of killing increases. As this continues, more and more actors surpass the individual-level thresholds above which killing is too risky to
consider. Perpetrators, knowing that they face punishment for killing, may reduce that risk in two ways: They may shirk the order completely and not kill at all, or they may choose a lower level of shirking and kill fewer civilians than ordered. Leaders, knowing that they face punishment for killing and the costs of disobedient perpetrators, may reduce their risk in two ways: They may not order killing at all, or they may order fewer civilians killed. If leaders choose not to order killing and/or perpetrators choose to shirk completely, the observable consequence is a reduced probability of killing. If leaders choose to lower the chosen death toll and/or perpetrators choose to shirk at lower levels, the observable consequence is a reduced civilian death toll. This discussion produces the following testable hypotheses:

H1: *Ceteris paribus, international organization naming and shaming decreases the likelihood of killing.*

H2: *Ceteris paribus, international organization naming and shaming decreases observed civilian death tolls.*

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

I test my hypotheses with a panel data research design. Temporally, my data begin in 1994 and the domain changes slightly across naming and shaming measures. The UN variables run through 2002, the media variable through 2000, and the NGO variable is available through 2004. Spatially, the UN variable covers 74 countries for which all variables are available over the temporal domain. That coverage extends to 84 countries using the media variable, and to 93 when focused on shaming by NGOs. A central concern with panel data is heterogeneity across units: in this case, state-specific effects may be unobserved and correlated with my independent variables (Greene 1981:283–290). Given more than two time periods, unbiased and consistent estimators can be obtained in such circumstances with cluster-robust standard errors (Stock and Watson 2006; Wooldridge 2002). Here, I cluster all standard errors by unit (that is, state), allowing observations within units to be correlated in an unknown way and permitting statistical and substantive inference.7

**Model Specification**

Extant research has focused on the benefits to be gained from killing, and assumed that a murderous policy can be implemented precisely as leaders desire. I relax that assumption and problematize the implementation of

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7 In the appendix, I show that results are robust to a simple panel specification regressing change in death toll on lagged deaths, lagged shaming, and change in shaming.
state-led killing. The theory suggests that under certain circumstances (for example, a naming and shaming campaign), the government may choose to moderate or not send the killing order and/or perpetrators may choose to kill at low rates or not kill, regardless of the conditions and incentives that favor killing. These decisions are based in part on beliefs, drawn from a public information environment, about the likelihood of international punishment for killing and the likelihood of internal punishment for disobedience. The information environment affects the likelihood and severity of killing, and does so in a process distinct from the process that makes killing a preferred policy. In short, I argue that killing results from a two-stage process: The government identifies killing as a useful way to pursue a desired policy. Then, it engages in the principal-agent interaction described above, where its ordered death toll and perpetrators’ implementation of the order are influenced by expectations of international and domestic punishment. Thus the data generating process distinguishes between the government’s desire to kill, and observed killing. My empirical strategy does the same.

Actors’ expectations about punishment are distinct from the conditions that make killing a useful way to achieve desired goals. The theory does not identify the factors that make killing a preferred policy, but shaming can only reduce killing in cases where killing is, first, desired. Overlooking this treatment effect would produce a nonrandom sample and, as Lemke and Reed (2001:126) note, “whenever cases are drawn by any rule other than randomization, selection bias is a potential problem.” Were I to test my hypotheses using only cases where killing campaigns had begun, my estimates would likely be biased. To limit this bias and conduct accurate hypothesis tests, I model the process by which governments develop preferences for killing with this sample-selection equation:

$$\Pr(Y_{it} \geq 1) = \alpha_1 + \gamma(z_{it}) + \varepsilon_{1it}$$

where $z$ is the set of costs and benefits that make killing an desired option, and $Y$ is the observed civilian death toll. Equation one thus has a binary dependent variable, and is estimated via probit. The estimation produces a parameter (the inverse Mills ratio, or IMR) which I use in subsequent estimations to correct for sample-selection bias. The IMR is calculated as follows, where $\phi(z)$ is the standard normal pdf, and $\Phi(z)$ is the standard normal cdf:

$$\Lambda(z_{it}) = \frac{\phi(z_{it})}{1 - \Phi(z_{it})}$$

where

**This is the same procedure detailed by Heckman (1979).**
and severity of government killing. Each is influenced by the principal-agent interaction described in this article, and by the desirability of killing modeled in equations one and two. By controlling for the desirability of killing through $\Lambda(z)$, I can explicitly model the P-A process. As a result, I can test the hypothesized effects of naming and shaming in the context where my theory expects them to matter. I conduct these hypothesis tests with two outcome equations:

$$\Pr(Y_{it} \geq 1) = \alpha_2 + \beta(x_{it}) + \rho[\Lambda(z_{it})] + \epsilon_{2it}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_3 + \psi(x_{it}) + \kappa[\Lambda(z_{it})] + \epsilon_{3it}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $x$ is the set of forces that affects the P-A interaction, $\Lambda(z)$ is the estimated desirability of killing from equations one and two, and $Y$ is the observed civilian death toll. Equation three has a binary dependent variable, and is estimated with a probit specification. Equation four has a continuous dependent variable, and is estimated via OLS regression.\(^9\) These estimators permit inference regarding the likelihood and severity of killing in the principal-agent context, which controlling for the desirability of killing that has been the focus of previous research. I produce unbiased coefficient estimates by considering the factors that lead to inclusion in the sample of interest.\(^{10}\)

### Operationalization and Measurement

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT KILLING**

My dependent variables, presence or absence of killing and the natural log of the number of civilians killed, come from the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF) Worldwide Atrocities Dataset.\(^{11}\) The data record civilian death tolls in the population of cases reported in the major international press agencies (Agence France Presse, Associated Press, New York Times, and Reuters) in which at least five noncombatants were killed.\(^{12}\)

To my knowledge, most datasets on government killing cast the ‘macro’ event of a larger conflict process as the unit of observation (for example, \(^{12}\)The victim count in these data has a mean of 45.5 with a standard deviation of 752.8, and ranges from 0 to 24447. I log this variable, and the resultant DV has a mean of $-5.894$ with $sd = 3.179$, and ranges from $-6.908$ to 10.104.

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\(^{9}\)The death toll is, of course, a count; taking its natural log transforms it to the continuous variable for which OLS is appropriate.

\(^{10}\)The system of equations is identified by including variables in the selection equation that are not expected to influence equations three and four. Here, this exclusion restriction is met with contextual variables (democracy, domestic dissent) that influence the state’s desire to kill but should not affect actors’ expectations about the likelihood of international punishment for killing.

\(^{11}\)More information and current data are available online at http://eventdata.psu.edu/data.dir/atrocities.html

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Downes 2007; Harff 2003) or focus on ‘micro’ events within the context of a single conflict process (for example, Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999). Researchers are limited to analyzing either the onset of conflicts involving atrocities or the dynamics of violence in the context of genocide. One consequence is the inability “to draw inferences about the likelihood of any deliberate violence against noncombatants in situations where none has yet occurred, or the dynamics of such violence in situations that may or may not rise to the level of genocide” (Ulfelder and Schrodt 2009:2). The PITF data records information from press accounts of killings occurring in all countries of the world during their period of observation, allowing researchers to study the risk of killing that may or may not accumulate to the level of mass killing.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Influences on desirability}

Before estimating the effects of the principal-agent interaction, I need to specify Equation 1 as a function of the forces that make killing a preferred policy. Existing work argues that these forces include a set of conditions (for example, civil war, international war, regime type) and a set of incentives (for example, domestic dissent) (see Downes 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Valentino et al. 2004).\textsuperscript{14} I use the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset to measure the presence of civil and/or international war (Themner and Wallensteen 2011; Gleditsch et al. 2002), and the Polity project’s $[-10,10]$ index of regime type to measure democracy (Marshall and Jaggers n.d.). To account for linear and nonlinear relationships between democracy and killing, I include the Polity index and a squared version thereof. I measure domestic dissent in two ways: violent dissent includes counts of riots, guerrilla tactics, and assassination attempts, while nonviolent dissent includes counts of strikes and peaceful public gatherings. All dissent data are drawn from Banks (n.d.).\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}In an analysis of alternative sources of information about state repression in Guatemala, Ball and Davenport (2002) find that different sources of information focus on different aspects of the behavior under investigation. They find that newspapers are “useful in documenting obvious behavior or that which is deemed politically salient within a specified political-geographic context . . . [but] may be relatively weaker at identifying events in more remote areas that occur during periods of relatively less state repressiveness and that are relatively smaller in scale.” (Ball and Davenport 2002:445) One consequence of using journalistic sources, then, is that low-level killings may be underreported in my dependent variable. The implications drawn from the quantitative analyses below may be less applicable to low-level killing events in rural areas when government repression is low than to other killing events.

\textsuperscript{14}Elements of civil and international war, most notably wars of attrition and territorial annexation, are also expected to increase the likelihood of killing (for example, Downes 2007; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006). These variables were initially included in the selection equation but dropped due to perfect collinearity. Thus, I report a binary measure of the presence/absence of war.

\textsuperscript{15}The Banks data end in 2003, while all other independent variables for the selection equation are available through 2007. In the online appendix, I show that all reported results are robust to dropping these dissent variables and extending temporal coverage an additional four years.
KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: NAMING AND SHAMING

To test my hypotheses, I relax the common assumption that the impact of shaming is constant across actors. Instead, I measure naming and shaming by three types of international organization.

First, I focus on international nongovernmental organizations. Many of these organizations have human rights mandates or mention human rights in their mission statements. I call these Human Rights Organizations (HROs), and note that much of their behavior is meant to shine a spotlight on abusive states. I count the number of shaming efforts by the set of 432 HROs using data from Murdie and Davis (2012). Next, I look at the news media. Media coverage of atrocities may increase international awareness and stimulate activism Ramos, Ron, and Thoms (2007). I measure this influence using the average number of reports published in The Economist and Newsweek and focused on a given country in a given year. The data come from Ramos, Ron, and Thoms (2007), who demonstrate that the average of these sources is a reasonable proxy for Northern media coverage.16

Finally, I look at intergovernmental organizations. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) “was the first global, intergovernmental organization charged specifically with safeguarding and promoting human rights around the world” (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:865). Both it and its 2006 successor (the UN Human Rights Council, HRC) promote respect for human rights in part by calling out individual countries for abuse. Alleged abusers are first targeted when the commission or council discusses the abuse in a private session.17 Once targeted, states face one of four possible outcomes: The commission or council could discontinue discussion, it could continue confidential consideration, it could issue a mild sanction via an advisory procedure or critical statement, or it could pass a resolution publicly condemning a state for abuse. Because these methods are designed to be increasingly severe, I combine them into a single ordinal index with higher values indicating more intense sanctions. These, and all shaming variables, are lagged one year so that actors’ reactions can be observed.

OTHER INFLUENCES ON KILLING

The principal-agent framework suggests that governments will try to coerce perpetrators to kill by monitoring them closely. I use state capacity to measure leaders’ ability to keep tabs on potential perpetrators, and conceptualize capacity as the state’s ability to implement public policy. Weller and Ziegler

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16In the online appendix, I demonstrate the robustness of my results to logging both the HRO and media shaming variables.

17Beginning in 1978, the CHR and HRC have published annual lists of the states they have considered in confidential session. However, the specifics of the allegations remain private. (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:864)
measure capacity as the proportion of personal and corporate income taxes to total tax revenue, and note that the measure requires states to “interact with citizens to monitor . . . behavior” (Weller and Ziegler 2008:13). Since perpetrators are a subset of the citizenry, this is a useful proxy for the government’s ability to monitor potential perpetrators. I use and extend Weller and Ziegler’s (2008) data on capacity.

Governments can also coerce killing by increasing the perpetrators’ expectations about how violent their punishment for disobedience (that is, sanctions) will be. I capture the perpetrator’s expectations about the relative violence of punishment for disobedience if she is caught ignoring the order to kill. The perpetrator’s best information with respect to the government’s violence is that government’s recent tendency toward violence. The more willing a state is to use violence in general, the more willing it is expected to be to use violence to punish disobedience. Similarly, the more violent a state is in general, the more violent is the expected punishment it will apply to disobedient perpetrators. I measure willingness to use violence with a two-year moving average of the government’s recent use of unlawful imprisonment, disappearance, and torture. The measure is built with data from Cingranelli and Richards (1999). It varies from zero to six, with higher values indicating an increasing willingness to violate those rights.

Above, I argue that shaming by international organizations raises actors’ expectations of international legal and economic punishment. Both actors will avoid killing to avoid punishment. Leaders also consider the likelihood that perpetrators will disobey the order to kill based on the threat of punishment, and will not order killing if they expect widespread disobedience. Vulnerability—to economic sanctions in particular—will vary with the extent to which leaders and perpetrators rely on foreign monies. To measure this, I begin with the World Development Indicator’s measure of foreign aid per capita (WDI n.d.). Then, I recognize that perpetrators’ vulnerability is also affected by how much incoming aid is likely to reach each individual perpetrator. Money is a private good, distributed only to members of the government’s winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2003). As the size of the winning coalition increases, the likelihood that a potential perpetrator receives and thus depends on foreign capital increases. To capture this mediating influence, I weight foreign aid per capita by the size of the winning coalition (W), drawing winning coalition data from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in the online appendix.
RESULTS

I first review the results for the sample-selection estimation, which are presented in Table 1. Each independent variable has been identified by the empirical literature as a meaningful influence on the government’s preference for killing. As the literature expects, past killing and violent dissent each increases the likelihood that killing occurs (Kalyvas 2006; Valentino et al. 2004). Also consistent with extant work, nonviolent dissent is negatively related to that likelihood, and democracy has a nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship with the same (Davenport 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). The estimated effect of war is negative and insignificant, suggesting that large-scale political violence makes state killing less likely. These results capture the conditions and incentives that make killing a desired government policy, independent of the delegation issues that emerge thereafter. By including them in subsequent analyses, I can test hypotheses about the process of killing while controlling for leader’s motivations to kill.

Estimated Effects of Naming and Shaming

Results for the outcome equations are presented in Table 2. Hypothesis 1 anticipated that shaming by international organizations would decrease the probability of subsequent killing; this hypothesis is tested in the first three columns of the table. Hypotheses 2 expected that international organization shaming would decrease civilian death tolls, and is tested in columns four through six. Below I present the results of all hypothesis tests, focusing on each international organization in turn.

### TABLE 1 Selection (Probit) Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Gov’t Killing ( \epsilon [0,1] )</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>r.s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Killing(_{i,t-1})</td>
<td>1.234***</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil and/or International War(_i)</td>
<td>-0.369**</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Dissent(_i)</td>
<td>0.229**</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Dissent(_i)</td>
<td>-0.081*</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy(_i)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy(^2)_(_i)</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-1.081***</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***\( p \leq .01 \); **\( p \leq .05 \); *\( p \leq .1 \), (two-tailed).

N = 1351, Pseudo-R\(^2\) = .1685

log likelihood = -374.069, Wald \( \chi^2 \) (6 df) = 100.45

Robust standard errors are clustered by country.

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\(^{20}\)This differs from the typical empirical finding that mass killing occurs almost exclusively during civil and/or international war (Downes 2008; Valentino 2000), and suggests that one promising area for future research would question whether one process drives both low- and high-level killing.
TABLE 2  Estimated Impacts of Naming and Shaming on Government Killing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effects on Pr(Kill)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Effects on ln(Death Toll)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>(r.s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRO Shaming (_{a-1})</td>
<td>(-0.701^{***})</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(-0.203^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Shaming (_{a-1})</td>
<td>(-0.163)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(-0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHRC Shaming (_{a-1})</td>
<td>(-0.179^{*})</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(-0.147^{*})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid (_{a})</td>
<td>(-0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(-0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Capacity (_{a})</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Repression (_{a-1})</td>
<td>(-0.002)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(-0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged) (_{a})</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse Mills Ratio</td>
<td>(-1.206^{***})</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(-2.841^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.076*</td>
<td>0.849*</td>
<td>0.625*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.1690</td>
<td>0.1355</td>
<td>0.1165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(***p \leq .01; **p \leq .05; ^{*}p \leq .1, \) (two-tailed).
Models estimated with probit (columns 1–3) and OLS (columns 4–6).
Robust standard errors are clustered by country.

What effect do international human rights NGOs have on government killing? As shown in the first column of Table 2, shaming by HROs has a statistically significant, negative influence on the likelihood of killing. As shown in column four, its effect on the natural log of civilian death tolls is also negative and statistically significant. I interpret this as support for both hypotheses: shaming by HROs has a pacific impact on both the probability and severity of government killing. Does shaming by the media have similar effects? The media’s effect on the likelihood of killing is presented in column two of Table 2, while its effect on the natural log of anticipated death tolls is presented in column five. In both cases, the estimated coefficients are negatively signed (as expected) but statistically insignificant. These results support neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2: In this sample, media attention has no significant impact on killing.

Finally, does the UN’s shaming behavior affect subsequent killing? In column three, its estimated effect on the likelihood of killing is negative and statistically significant. In column six, its estimated effect on expected death tolls is again negative and significant. As expected, shaming by the UN Commission on Human Rights reduces both the probability and the severity
of state killing; again, this supports hypotheses 1 and 2. Overall, two of the three actors whose shaming methods were analyzed—HROs and the UN—exert significant negative effects on the likelihood of killing, and on the severity of death tolls when it does occur. The news media did not have a significant effect. I unpack the substantive impacts of these results below, and discuss their implications in the conclusion. First, I review other estimated impacts on government killing.

Other Estimated Effects

The theory anticipated that government monitoring capacity would increase the probability and severity of killing. Influences on probability are presented in columns one through three of Table 2, while influences on death tolls are in columns four through six. In all six models, capacity is positively signed (as expected) but does not attain statistical significance. Leaders’ ability to monitor perpetrators may incentivize those perpetrators to kill, but that effect disappears—at least in the current sample—when monitoring is considered alongside a countervailing incentive not to kill (that is, naming and shaming).

Next, I expect actors’ beliefs about the severity of punishment for shirking to positively impact body counts. To that end, a 2-year moving average of the government’s use of unlawful imprisonment, torture, and disappearances appears in all six models in Table 2. The estimated coefficient is negative, and statistically insignificant, in all six. In this sample, recent repression other than killing has no appreciable effect on that killing. I also consider the possibility of vulnerability to economic sanctions by the international community. Thus foreign aid, weighted by winning coalition size, appears in all six models. In all six, it is negatively signed and statistically insignificant; in this sample, foreign aid does not affect government killing.

Finally, the IMR used to capture the leader’s motivations to kill is statistically significant across all six models in Table 2. This suggests, and intuition supports, that those motivations are a critical part of the process that leads to government killing. Yet even accounting for desirability, naming and shaming exerts a pacific impact. As the $R^2$ values in the bottom row of the table demonstrate, desirability and shaming together explain between twelve and seventeen percent of variable in the binary observation of killing, and between nine and thirteen percent of variance in civilian deaths. Given these results, I submit that the principal-agent interaction that follows the government’s preference for killing is an important part of the killing process. And, I believe these results are promising enough to motivate additional research within this theoretical framework. Below, I return to the research question that generated the current effort, and unpack the substantive impacts of naming and shaming on one-sided government killing.
Substantive Effects of Naming and Shaming

Theory suggests, and empirical results support, the claim that killing is the outcome of a process of interaction between the government that sends the killing order and perpetrators who carry it out. This conceptualization offers two opportunities for international organizations to save lives: they may try to lower the likelihood of killing, or they may try to limit body counts. Which approach is more effective? Which will lead to the greater preservation of life? To answer these questions, I simulate the effects of shaming on the likelihood that killing occurs, and on the natural log of the expected death toll when it does.\(^{21}\)

Figure 1 shows the relationship between HRO shaming and the probability of killing in the top panel, and the relationship between HRO shaming and the predicted natural log of civilian death tolls on the bottom. In both graphs, the solid black line captures the mean probability of killing, while the dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval. In the top panel, the negative trend suggests that as HROs increasingly publicize atrocities, the targeted state is decreasingly likely to experience government killing. In this sample, the likelihood of killing in the absence of HRO shaming is 14%, with a 95% confidence interval of (0.13, 0.15). Introducing an average level of shaming drops that likelihood to 12% (0.115, 0.125). From there, the decline in the likelihood of killing is exponential. Ultimately, a three-standard deviation increase above average HRO shaming corresponds to a 0.04% likelihood of killing (0.039, 0.049). In this sample, five HRO shaming events reduce the probability that civilians lose their lives to less than one half of 1%.

Turning to the bottom panel of Figure 1, there is again a clear negative trend: As HROs increasingly publicize atrocities, the state in the spotlight produces ever-smaller body counts. In the absence of HRO attention, the predicted natural log is \(-5.5\) (\(-5.6, -5.4\)). An average level of shaming lowers that number to \(-5.9\) (\(-6.0, -5.8\)). From there, the decline in the natural log of the death toll as HRO shaming increases is linear; a three-standard deviation increase above average HRO shaming results in a predicted \(\ln(\text{body count})\) of \(-6.6\) (\(-6.65, -6.45\)). In this sample, five HRO shaming events reduce the natural log of expected deaths by 1.1.

Next, Figure 2 presents the effects of punishment by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Effects on the probability of killing are in the top panel, while effects on the natural log of expected death tolls are presented in the bottom. In both graphs, moving from the leftmost column to the rightmost

\(^{21}\)Substantive implications are in-sample predictions. Rather than fix all variables at central values, I fix the variable of interest in each case and allow others to vary as they do in the data. In practice, the results are comparable to those generated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). Where CLARIFY assumes normality, these results are generated without making any assumptions about the underlying distribution of the coefficient estimates.
FIGURE 1 Effects of HRO shaming on government killing.

captures increasingly severe punishment by the CHR; the top of each column is the mean prediction, and the whiskers surrounding that point capture the relevant 95% confidence interval. The general trend in the top panel is negative, so that increasingly severe punishment consistently decreases the likelihood that killing occurs. In the absence of CHR attention, the likelihood of killing in this sample is 12.5% with a 95% confidence interval of (0.117, 0.134). Being targeted by the commission lowers that likelihood to 9.5% (0.087, 0.101); this impact is exerted even when the CHR discontinues
confidential consideration and takes no further action. If the Commission chooses to continue consideration after targeting, the likelihood of killing drops to 7.1% (0.065, 0.076). Additional attention continues to lower that probability: Punishment through advisory procedure or critical statement decreases it to 5.2% (0.048, 0.056), and public resolutions decrease it further to 3.8% (0.035, 0.041).

The same negative trend is apparent in the bottom panel of Figure 2. In this sample, the anticipated ln(death toll) in the absence of HRC attention...
is $-5.67$ ($-5.75, -5.59$). Being targeted for HRC attention, even in the absence of additional shaming, reduces that number to $-5.82$ ($-5.89, -5.74$). Continued consideration further reduces $\ln(\text{death toll})$ to $-5.96$ ($-6.04, -5.89$). Again, additional HRC attention continues to lower the expected casualty rate: Punishment through advisory procedure or critical statement lowers the value to $-6.11$ ($-6.19, -6.03$), and public resolutions drop it to $-6.26$ ($-6.33, -6.18$). I discuss the relevance of these results for policymakers and scholars below.

**CONCLUSION**

I conceptualize government killing as a principal-agent problem, and model civilian death tolls as the outcome of a process in which leaders develop preferences for killing and then engage in strategic interactions with individual perpetrators on the ground. This stylization reveals an opportunity for international organizations to save lives: Being thrust into the spotlight for committing atrocities calls the attention of international actors capable of levying tangible punishment. This makes killing risky in three ways. First, naming and shaming threatens leaders with immediate legal and/or economic punishment for killing. Second, shaming threatens perpetrators with the same types of punishment. Finally, shaming threatens leaders by raising the risk of sending an order and having it subsequently disobeyed; this is risky because it undermines the leader’s monopoly on the forces of coercion, and therefore undermines his control of the state. As leaders’ and perpetrators’ perceptions of risk increase, more of them surpass the threshold above which they are unwilling to order killing (for leaders) or kill civilians (for perpetrators). In particular, leaders respond to increasing riskiness (that is, naming and shaming) by deciding not to kill and/or reducing their requested death toll. Perpetrators respond to the same increasing riskiness by refusing to kill and/or killing at lower levels. The aggregate observable consequences of this process are reductions in both the likelihood and severity of one-sided government killing.

Empirical results support these insights, and suggest that international organizations are capable of challenge potentially murderous states. These results have implications for both policymakers and scholars. From a policy perspective, I analyze the effects of shaming by three different actors. Findings suggest that shaming by international NGOs lower both the likelihood and severity of killing, reducing the former more quickly than the latter. They also suggest that shaming by the UN’s Commission on Human Rights has a similar effect, lowering the probability of killing as well as expected death tolls, but reducing the probability that killing occurs more quickly than its severity once it begins. These results suggest that international organizations may be better equipped to prevent killing from beginning than
to limit mounting body counts once it has started. Results also suggest that media shaming is ineffective: coverage by the news media did not lower the probability of killing, nor did it decrease emergent body counts. Yet even this null finding may be cause for optimism: In no case did international organizations shaming have counterproductive impacts on killing. Overall, the findings in this article paint a hopeful portrait of shaming as an international policy. At worst, the strategy has no unintended or dangerous consequences for government killing. At best, it saves the lives of innocents who might otherwise be lost.

For researchers, I develop our understanding of leaders’ motivations to kill by problematizing their subsequent interactions with perpetrators. Under this framework, shaming decreases state killing because it makes murder more risky for leaders and perpetrators. What effect does it have on other types of physical integrity abuse? Here, I assume that killing is a means to an end rather than a goal in itself—leaders prefer to kill in pursuit of important policy objectives (for example, victory in war, quelling domestic dissent). Are there other options leaders can use to achieve those same objectives (torture, for example, or political imprisonment)? If so, how do they navigate the choice among available tactics? Most generally, can leaders substitute one mechanism for another to achieve the same end? How might this illuminate the decision to abandon killing in the face of shaming?

I also assumed that perpetrators have no instrumental preferences; their utility derives solely from the consequences of their choices. What if some perpetrators kill without orders, or kill at levels above those requested as Mueller (2000) suggests? How might these “rogue” agents affect the process? Finally, I have interpreted the media’s insignificance to mean that media shaming has no impact on killing. Perhaps the media plays an indirect role. Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that shaming events that reach the press become amplified. If so, then perhaps the media’s role is to make other actors’ shaming efforts louder, to broadcast them more widely, and thus to increase the likelihood of legal and/or economic punishment for killing? Though beyond the scope of the current article, these strike me as important questions for scholars interested in understanding repression in general and government killing in particular. Repressive policy substitutability is the thrust of my current research program. I welcome future research to determine the effects of rogue agency and an interactive media in the context of the strategic interaction that produces civilian death tolls.

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